Emotional Damages and Childbirth Injuries: The Court Reaffirms Limits on Recovery

For decades, New York law has strictly limited when plaintiffs may recover for emotional damages in medical malpractice cases. While the courts have recognized certain exceptions over the years, emotional distress claims have traditionally been viewed with caution, particularly when they stem from injury to another person rather than direct injury to the plaintiff.

In Sheppard–Mobley v. King, 4 N.Y.3d 627(2005), the Court of Appeals held a mother could not recover damages for emotional distress caused by negligent prenatal care when her child was born alive, even if the child later died from injuries sustained before birth. The Court distinguished these cases from those involving stillbirths or miscarriages, where recovery for emotional damages has been permitted, reasoning that the live birth created a separate legal personhood that broke the causal connection between the injury to the fetus and the mother’s emotional harm.

Nearly two decades later, this distinction was revisited recently in SanMiguel v. Grimaldi, decided on October 21, 2025, in the Court of Appeals. In that case, the plaintiff, Veronica SanMiguel, brought an action against her physician, Dr. Meryl Grimaldi, and St. Barnabas Hospital, alleging medical malpractice during childbirth. Her child was born alive, but suffered severe injuries and passed away eight days later. SanMiguel sought damages for the emotional trauma caused by witnessing and enduring her child’s suffering.

The Court of Appeals, however, declined to alter existing precedent. Relying on Sheppard–Mobley, the majority reaffirmed that New York law does not permit recovery for purely emotional damages in cases where the child is born alive, even if survival is brief and marked by severe injury. The Court reasoned that expanding liability in this context would conflict with New York’s long-standing reluctance to recognize emotional harm claims absent direct physical injury or an independent duty owed to the plaintiff.

In a strong dissent, several judges urged the Court to reconsider this rule. They argued that the precedent creates arbitrary distinctions between cases involving stillbirths and those involving brief live births, denying compensation to mothers who suffer profound emotional injury. The dissent suggested either overturning Sheppard–Mobley entirely or creating a narrow exception for cases in which the child is born with minimal consciousness and cannot survive independently of medical intervention. The dissenting judges emphasized that modern tort law and medical understanding of emotional trauma have evolved, and the common law should evolve with them.

For now, however, SanMiguel v. Grimaldi leaves New York’s rule unchanged: emotional damages remain unavailable to mothers in medical malpractice cases where the child is born alive, even if the survival period is brief and the child’s injuries are the direct result of negligence. The decision reaffirms the Court’s cautious approach to expanding emotional distress claims, but it also highlights a growing judicial and societal debate over whether these long-standing boundaries still serve the interests of justice.

Giulia R. Marino, Esq.